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Grant Leach

Grant focuses his practice on international trade, international compliance, securities, mergers, acquisitions and general corporate matters.

On March 8, 2022, President Biden issued Executive Order 14066 which prohibits the following actions:

  • The importation into the United States of any “crude oil; petroleum; petroleum fuels, oils, and products of their distillation; liquefied natural gas; coal; and coal products” of “Russian Federation origin”;
  • New investment in the Russian energy sector by U.S. persons, wherever located; and
  • Any approval, financing, facilitation, or guarantee by a U.S. person, wherever located, of any transaction conducted by a non-U.S. person that would be prohibited by Executive Order 14066 if performed by a U.S. person or within the United States.

On February 24, 2022, the U.S. imposed sweeping sanctions and export controls actions in response to the Russian Federation’s (“Russia”) “war of choice” against Ukraine.  (Husch Blackwell summarized the February 24, 2022 actions in a Client Alert published here, as well as more limited actions on February 21-22 here and here.)  The past ten (10) days have featured a flurry  of new sanctions and rapidly evolving regulations and executive orders imposed by the U.S. President, the Department of State, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of the Treasury addressing the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine.  Below are the latest updates in chronological order.

On February 22, 2022, one day after the Russian Federation formally recognized the Donetsk People’s Republic (“DNR”) and Luhansk People’s Republic (“LNR”) of Ukraine as “independent states” and the Biden Administration responded by imposing a sanctions embargo against the DNR and LNR regions, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) took further action against Russia by imposing new sanctions against the Russian financial services sector, Russian oligarchs and their family members.  OFAC imposed these additional sanctions using Executive Order 14024 (“EO 14024”), which was issued on April 15, 2021 and which authorizes OFAC to sanction operators in Russia’s technology and defense sectors as well as other sectors as determined by the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury in consultation with the U.S. Secretary of State. 

On February 21, 2022, U.S. President Joseph R. Biden Jr. issued an Executive Order (the “Ukraine Order”) in response to action taken earlier in the day by Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin to recognize the Donetsk People’s Republic (“DNR”) and Luhansk People’s Republic (“LNR”) of Ukraine as “independent states”.  The DNR and LNR are two separatist bodies which have asserted governmental authority over the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine, respectively, without authorization from the Government of Ukraine.  In 2014, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) added the DNR and LNR to its Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (the “SDN List”) in their capacities as individual entities.  Since then, OFAC has also added multiple officials associated with the DNR and LNR to the SDN List.

Effective January 13, 2022, the U.S. Census Bureau’s (“Census”) Automated Export System (“AES”) began issuing a response code 66Q notifying Electronic Export Information (“EEI”) filers whenever they enter an export control classification number (“ECCN”) and destination combination that is prohibited under the Export Administration Regulations’ (“EAR”) destination-based controls.  For now, such mismatches in filings will

Russia has amassed more than 100,000 troops at the Ukrainian border, leading the White House to issue a warning on January 25 that the U.S. is “prepared to implement sanctions with massive consequences that were not considered in 2014 [when Russia invaded and annexed the Crimea region of Ukraine]” if Russia “further invades Ukraine”.  President

As tensions run high between Washington and Moscow over a possibly imminent Russian invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) designated today four (4) current and former Ukrainian officials under Executive Order (“EO”) 14024 dated April 15, 2021.  In a press release issued earlier today, OFAC asserted the Russian Federal Security Service (“FSB”) “recruit[s] Ukrainian citizens in key positions to gain access to sensitive information, threaten the sovereignty of Ukraine, and then leverage these Ukrainian officials to create instability in advance of a potential Russian invasion.”  OFAC also noted that Russian agents have sought to influence U.S. elections since at least 2016.

In an October 21, 2021 interim final rule (“IFR”), the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) published long-awaited “cybersecurity items” controls in Categories 4 (Computers) and 5, Pt. 1 (Telecommunications) of the Commerce Control List (“CCL”) and followed the IFR up on November 12, 2021 with relevant FAQs.  The IFR will impose new export controls on certain “cybersecurity items” that relate to “intrusion software” or “IP network communications surveillance.” The IFR, originally scheduled to become effective on January 19, 2022, will now become effective on March 7, 2022.  In the January 12, 2022 notice announcing the delay, BIS stated it “may consider some modifications for the final rule” and indicated it would “provide the public with additional guidance.”  Below we describe the IFR as it currently stands.  We will update readers when BIS implements any additional edits to the IFR and/or updates its guidance.

On October 5, 2021, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) published a final rule in the Federal Register that places new controls on software and technology that can potentially be used for manufacturing biological weapons. The rule comes after a decision in May 2021 by the forty-three (43) participant countries

The Department of Commerce’s (“Commerce”) Bureau of Industry & Security (“BIS”) recently issued requests for comment on risks to the information communications and technology (“ICT”) and semiconductor supply chains.  These comments are being requested as part of the U.S. government’s broader review of supply chain vulnerabilities (see here, here, and here).

ICT